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Summary: Following the approaches of Fisher, Koo, and in particular Minsky, 
this article describes recent developments in the Spanish economy. These
authors’ theories of financial fragility, and the extension of analysis of the re-
cession to also include the expansionary period, are very useful when it comes 
to understanding the boom (1994-2008) and subsequent collapse of the Span-
ish economy. Both processes are part of the same phenomenon: the binomial
relation between debt and the asset bubble, amplified by the use of external
financing, and the subsequent process of slow deleveraging. Alongside said
analytical elements, and considering Spain’s membership in the Eurozone
monetary union system, this characterisation of the euphoria and subsequent
balance-sheet recession further identifies specific features of the Spanish 
economy that informed current outcomes.
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The financial and economic crisis that has affected the world’s economies since 2008 
has meanwhile raised questions about conventional economic approaches. First, be-
cause most of those using orthodox approaches (with very few exceptions such as 
Robert J. Shiller or Nouriel Roubini) proved incapable of foreseeing or preventing a 
crisis of even this magnitude; and second, because orthodoxy insists on misdiagnos-
ing the very nature of the crisis, thus preventing the adoption of an appropriate strat-
egy for addressing it. In this paper, we intend to overcome such shortcomings by 
providing an explanation of the crisis based on alternative theoretical references 
which, in our opinion, may offer a better diagnosis of the situation. 
One of the most significant aspects of the current crisis, and one which has 
generated the most specialised literature, is the fact that the Eurozone has been the 
most severely affected region. Important issues on which no consensus exists within 
the discipline include: to what extent was the institutional design of the single cur-
rency area a cause of, or aggravating factor in, the crisis? Also, what specific role did 
the so-called peripheral countries of Europe play in this process? In this context, 
close study of the Spanish case carries special interest. 
In short, the purpose of this article is to analyse the crisis (which we character-
ise as a recession caused by over-indebtedness) that has battered the Spanish econ-
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omy for close to a decade. To do this, we begin in Section 1 by explaining our theo-
retical framework, based on an approach that we term Kaleckian regarding the role of 
demand in the cycle, also adopting the endogenous money approach. In particular, 
the approaches of Fisher, Minsky, and Koo have proven very useful. In addition to a 
general theoretical framework, our analysis further requires the consideration of 
more specific factors. In the second section, we look at those factors particular to the 
Spanish case. The article sets third an explanation of the process of over-
indebtedness that gradually took shape in the Spanish economy, and that imploded 
into recession in 2008. Finally, we offer our conclusions. 
 
1. Recession and Over-Indebtedness: Basic Elements of the 
Analysis 
 
The current global economic situation invites us to reconsider certain theoretical con-
tributions that have not enjoyed the greatest academic popularity. In particular, recent 
experiences of debt-based growth followed by financial crisis and recession, exacer-
bated by deleveraging, compel us update two basic theoretical approaches. The first 
relates to the inherently cyclical nature of capitalist economies and the decisive role 
of demand, and especially investment, in the cycle (John Maynard Keynes 1965; 
Michal Kalecki 1971). The second looks at the centrality of the financial dimension 
in macroeconomics, from a perspective known as the endogenous money approach, 
which assumes a close link between the credit-driven creation of money by the fi-
nancial system and the demand for spending within an economy (Basil J. Moore 
1988; Steve Keen 2011a; L. Randall Wray 2015). From this double theoretical start-
ing point regarding the role of demand and finance in the economic cycle, this paper 
argues that the nature of the expansion phase, and particularly the conditions of over-
indebtedness through which demand is financed, represent a key explanatory element 
in understanding the gestation and subsequent manifestation of the crisis in Spain. 
Without adhering to them on all points, we base our analytical framework on 
contributions by Irving Fisher (1932, 1933) on debt deflation, as well as the subse-
quent and broader financial fragility hypothesis formulated by Hyman P. Minsky 
(1982). The Minskyan notion of financial fragility and our reinterpretation of the 
work of Fisher in terms of recession as caused by over-indebtedness are central theo-
retical features of this analysis.  
Fisher’s analysis of recession in the context of over-indebtedness is essential 
in defining the formula on which we base much of our explanation of the Spanish 
situation. However, we should make explicit that Fisher’s view on the role of defla-
tion within the recessive sequence strikes us as open to slight modification; in any 
case, it is not essential to our analysis. In keeping with other authors such as Martin 
H. Wolfson (1996), we believe that the mere fact that a deflationary spiral is not acti-
vated does not invalidate the fundamentals of Fisher’s bold approach on the perverse 
over-indebtedness / recession binomial. The key to his work, as we understand it, 
appears in his explanation of the specific type of recession that can derive from a 
debt crisis. In short, there are three crucial analytical elements: (i) that an excessive 
debt burden impacts on both the financial position of the banks and the weakness of 
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demand from indebted agents - two key elements in explaining the crisis; (ii) that in a 
recession, the desperate task of cleaning up balance sheets (deleveraging) carried out 
simultaneously by the various private sector agents feeds decisively back into the 
recession; (iii) that while over-indebtedness exacerbates the recession, the recession 
itself restricts the ability to generate income and becomes an obstacle to the repay-
ment of debt. Thus general over-indebtedness, problems within the financial system, 
and weak demand combine and underpin a particularly serious recessionary spiral. 
This focus on the perverse interplay between recession and over-indebtedness 
appears to have influenced Minsky’s well-known and fruitful Financial Instability 
Hypothesis (Minsky 1982, 1986). Other more recent authors have also been influ-
enced by Fisher’s approach and have integrated it into a broader macroeconomic 
view (Mervyn King 1994; Wolfson 1996; Robert W. Dimand 1997; Shiller 2013). 
For Minsky’s hypothesis of financial fragility, we recommend Keen (1995, 2011b). 
Minsky asks whether a phenomenon like the Great Depression might be re-
peated (Can it happen again?), starting from the Keynesian idea that an affirmative 
answer requires the creation of an analytical approach capable of integrating reces-
sion as a non-exceptional possibility. In that work, Minsky addresses recession due to 
over-indebtedness from a broader perspective than that of Fisher, zooming out to 
include the expansionary phase of the cycle in his analysis. The innovative and most 
significant element for our analysis is that Minsky explains how, during the boom, 
the economy is actively developing the very financial fragility that will lead to the 
crisis: from a financially sound situation, the same conditions that define the growth 
context also generate a situation of “euphoria” that tends to overstate expectations 
about profits. Meanwhile, overstated forecasts of expected profits encourage invest-
ment to be financed at higher rates of leverage which, at some point, will be revealed 
as unpayable from those returns actually obtained from the investments made (Ponzi 
scheme). In this way, the normal evolution of the economy makes the financial posi-
tion of the agents more fragile. The speculative dynamic and the formation of bub-
bles represents the climax of the sequence. 
Finally, the accumulated systemic fragility becomes evident when an event, 
although not necessarily decisive in itself, manages to undermine the euphoric expec-
tations that support growth. This change in perception around financial sustainability 
has an impact on the credit bubble and precipitates a change in the cycle. Both ideas 
(that the very conditions underlying expansion lead to financial fragility, as well as 
the emphasis on a change in expectations as determinative of the turning point in the 
cycle) are vital, as will be shown, to characterisation of the Spanish case. 
We conclude this theoretical overview of recession due to over-indebtedness 
by briefly taking into account the work of Richard C. Koo (2011a, b). We are par-
ticularly interested in Koo because he stresses that a key characteristic of recessions 
due to over-indebtedness is that agents are forced to play a leading role in a process 
of deleveraging, and that reduces demand and thereby exacerbates the recession. This 
situation, known as a balance-sheet recession, is one where even in a context of very 
low interest rates, agents insist on reducing their spending as much as possible, in 
order to save and/or repay their debt (see Section 4.2). The repayment of debt, from 
this perspective, serves to deepen the recession. In short, in his balance-sheet reces-
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sion approach, Koo highlights the counter-productive (recessive) impact of delever-
aging in a situation such as the one described. 
 
2. Spain-Specific Factors in the Exceptional Structure that Is 
Europe 
 
The analytical elements explained in the previous section are necessary but alone 
insufficient to address our subject matter; other specific factors are also essential to a 
proper analysis of the Spanish case. 
 
2.1 Member of a Monetary Union 
 
First of all, the Spanish economy is part of the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
The uniqueness of the EMU resides in the fact that it is a monetary union involving 
sovereign states that issue their own public debt, but in a common currency.  
Monetary integration is a result of two interrelated processes: a wider process 
of European integration already underway (Charles P. Kindleberger 2011, p. 613), 
and free movement of capital, finally adopted in June 1988 (Rawi Abdelal 2009, p. 
69). So the monetary union was an attempt to solve the problem of Robert Mundell’s 
impossible trinity, posed by the prior fixed-exchange rates system (the European 
Monetary System) and the subsequent German monetary dominance, as evidenced 
by European crisis in 1992 (Robert A. Mundell 1963; Abdelal 2009). 
With common institutions such as the European Central Bank, problems of 
asymmetry and the degree of unilateralism are reduced, since Germany now shares 
votes with the other economies. However, this shared monetary policy poses an addi-
tional governance problem evident from the current crisis: the common monetary 
policy is shared by creditors and debtors alike. 
 
2.2 Acute External Dependency 
 
The Spanish growth dynamic has been structurally dependent on the external sector 
for at least two basic aspects: capital goods and finance. 
The first of these is explained by the Spanish production model, where expan-
sion cycles are particularly strong in imports, especially of intermediate goods, partly 
due to the dependence by the Spanish economy on imported raw materials and en-
ergy supplies; transnational intra-corporate trade and technological scarcities of 
Spanish industry are also explanatory factors. Another factor in Spain’s external de-
pendence is the production specialisation of its industry, some key sectors of which 
(such as automobile production) are part of transnational value chains (Josep Banyuls 
and Raúl Lorente 2008). 
The second aspect of external dependence, of particular interest for our analy-
sis, is financial in nature. In an open economy with free movement of capital, such as 
Spain’s, domestic demand is not constrained by national savings, and financial needs 
can be met by recourse to external financing (Bibiana Medialdea García and Antonio 
Sanabria Martín 2012). The financial euphoria stage, in a context of extraordinarily 
easy international movement of capital, amplifies the expansion of credit predicted 
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by Minsky. The use of external borrowing, which (as we shall see) reached very high 
levels in the Spanish economy, thus permit a boost in demand to be financed with 
debt. At the same time, the massive inflow of capital contributes to an increase in the 
price of the assets of such investments (fuelling bubbles), which in turn increases the 
borrowing capacity and aggregate demand. 
The growing divergence between the investment and savings rates during the 
expansion stage results, in terms of national accounts, in the current account deficit. 
As Jorge Uxó, Jesús Paúl, and Eladio Febrero (2011, p. 573) argue, current imbal-
ances are explained from the behavior of domestic demand. Thus extensive growth in 
productive investment, along with the growth in aggregate demand, becomes possi-
ble thanks to the increased use of external financing. So growth in the Spanish econ-
omy is counterbalanced by a growing deficit in the current account.  
 
2.3 Banking Fragility 
 
The link between domestic demand and external financing requires an intermediary 
to connect the two, and in the Spanish economy, this is mainly focused on retail 
banking.  
During the expansion period, the presence of strong demand for loans (see 
Section 3.1) added to the huge liquidity in international financial markets that al-
lowed banks to leverage liquidity; and this explains the rapid growth of Spanish 
banks, which saw their assets multiply by 3.5 between 1997 and 2007 (Analistas Fi-
nancieros Internacionales (AFI) 2012, p. 233). Access to that huge flow of external 
liquidity, later reinforced by the arrival of the Euro and the appeal of eliminating cur-
rency risk, encouraged the expansion of the sector. This strong growth, boosted by 
the aforementioned leverage in liquidity, resulted in the skyrocketing debt of banks, 
as compared to the performance of other institutional sectors. Thus, in the first quar-
ter 1999, total debt of financial institutions related to GDP was at 10.6%, compared 
to 51.6% and 36.8% for non-financial corporations and households, respectively. 
However, by the first quarter of 2009 that debt-to-GDP ratio had shot to 102.6% for 
financial institutions (and 133.9% and 84.0% for non-financial corporations and 
households, respectively; data from Bank of Spain1). 
Banking expanded at the cost of creating substantial financial fragility, as pre-
dicted by the Minsky approach: the growth dynamic itself creates an overvaluation of 
expected earnings, while the risks are underestimated. We need to take into account 
that, given this combination of overvalued expectations and undervalued risk, the 
banks tend to increase their leverage in order to increase their profitability, intensify-
ing their own financial fragility. Moreover, given that their main source of income is 
lending money, banking expansion has a clear impact on overall financial fragility as 
it provides increased funding to the other economic sectors. This is especially impor-
tant in the case of Spanish real estate, not only for speculative reasons (as in Min-
sky’s Ponzi phase) but also because it allowed banks to increase funding through the 
securitization of mortgage loans (cédulas hipotecarias).  
 
                                                        
1 Bank of Spain. 2015. Financial Accounts, Chapter 2b. 
http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/ccff/cfcap2.html (accessed May 13, 2015). 
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Three additional aspects served to aggravate even further, if possible, the risks 
of this increasing financial fragility of Spanish banks. One was their dependence on 
external finance, which made them more vulnerable to possible external shocks. As 
we will see later, more than half of the debt held by Spanish banks is sourced from 
abroad. Second, the high concentration of their business in the property sector meant 
that in 2006, according to data from the Bank of Spain, 60% of the credit to “other 
domestic sectors” was concentrated in loans to the real estate sector. And third, a 
strong interplay arose between bank risk and sovereign risk, explained by the combi-
nation of the following elements: the weight of government guarantees when issuing 
bank securities2; the impact of bank recapitalisations on public debt; and the large 
volume of public debt held by the banks. In turn, sovereign risk in the Eurozone, 
heightened by the threat of a break-up of the monetary union, resulted in greater pe-
nalisation of the banks by the market. 
 
2.4 Fiscal Fragility 
 
Another feature of the Spanish case lies on the fiscal side. Since joining the Eurozone 
as one of the founding members, the Spanish economy has remained within the limits 
set in the Stability and Growth Pact. In 2005, a budgetary surplus was even achieved 
for the first time in Spain’s democracy. However, the arrival of the crisis sharply re-
versed this situation, leading to the greatest fiscal crisis in decades. In 2009, the 
budget deficit reached a record rate of 11.1% of GDP. The sudden deterioration of 
the public finances added a specific element that, as we shall see, aggravated the re-
cession in Spain. 
The crisis has had an impact on the fiscal situation more as a result of falling 
income than any increase in public spending. In effect, although the automatic stabi-
lisers increase spending, especially due to rising unemployment, the public-spending-
to-GDP ratio has always remained below the European average (Manuel Lago Peñas 
2012, pp. 21-22). Meanwhile, the Spanish tax burden is substantially lower than the 
European average. In the period 2007-2014, tax burden was eight percent below the 
Eurozone average (37.1%, compared to 45.1% of GDP, according to the IMF). This 
was aggravated by the fact that the main means of raising revenue in Spain are taxes 
on employment. 
 
2.5 Monetary Risk: Moving from a Strong to a Weak Currency 
 
In the case of Spain, in addition to the aforementioned governance problem resulting 
from creditors and debtors sharing a currency, there is another complication: the pos-
sible reversal of the process of integration into the Euro. The negative impact of this 
possible event threatens to become even greater in those Eurozone economies that, 
like Spain’s, accumulate a large stock of external debt.  
Between 2002 and 2009, the external debt of the private sector multiplied by 
4.5: from 468 billion to 2.1 trillion Euros. In the last year of the period, private exter-
                                                        
2 According to Eurostat data, in 2013 the total stock of government guarantees is 18.4 % of GDP, a ratio 
surpassed only by Austria (35%) and Ireland (32.1 %). These guarantees are used to regain access to 
wholesale financing. 
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nal debt accounted for 82.2% of total external debt. Meanwhile, the weight of public 
external debt as a proportion of total debt gained real importance only from the start 
of the crisis, as a result of the internal financing difficulties. 
This very high weight of private external debt increased the cost of a hypo-
thetical exit from the Euro, since this stock of debt would continue to be valued on 
the basis of what would then become a foreign currency (the Euro), against which the 
new local currency would be devalued sharply. As a result, the real burden of this 
external private debt would be multiplied. In addition, the positive effect of the de-
valuation would be at least partly offset by the increase in the cost of importing in-
termediate goods, which as we know are vital for the Spanish economy. Not only 
would access to international funding be more expensive, but it would be made more 
difficult by having what would likely be an unstable new currency, at least in the 
short term. This is the so-called “original sin” risk (Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo 
Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza 2002) which increases the need to earn foreign currency 
in order to be able to use foreign finance. Finally, we should point out the risk of 
bank-runs associated with the possible change of currency, and the mass withdrawal 
of deposits in the face of a consequent devaluation. 
 
3. Over-Indebtedness and the Recession in Spain 
 
Between 1994 and 2008, the Spanish economy experienced its most intense and 
long-lasting cycle of uninterrupted growth in recent decades. However, this expan-
sion stage led to the most severe and persistent post-war recession. Both processes, 
boom and bust, are in reality interconnected. In this section we consider them using 
the analytical framework described in Section 1 and the Spanish specificities ana-
lysed in Section 2. 
 
3.1 A Minskyan Growth Cycle 
 
The growth of the Spanish economy presents unmistakable elements of the specula-
tive euphoria stage described by Minsky. In effect, in the context of financial liber-
alisation and mass access to credit, Spain aggravated its external financial depend-
ence by developing a type of growth that can literally be considered as debt-led 
(Engelbert Stockhammer 2011; Eckhard Hein 2013) and which took the economy to 
an extreme degree of financial fragility. 
The situation of over-indebtedness is evident to the extent that credit growth 
substantially exceeds the increase in nominal GDP in a sustained manner. We can 
examine this euphoria stage by comparing the development of the growth rate of 
nominal GDP and of credit to other domestic sectors (i.e. credit to the non-financial 
private sector: households and businesses). According to the data, the mismatch is 
very considerable. During the upturn, GDP oscillates in a stable manner around 
nominal growth rates of between 5% and 8%, while from 1997, credit growth year-
on-year is always at double-digit rates, exceeding 20% per annum from June 2005. 
This decoupling indicates that during the expansion there is a growing amount of 
financing directed not at the production process, but at the purchase of existing assets 
as a result of profit expectations (speculative dynamic). As shown in the graph be-
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assets (the principal being a basic necessity), to which one must add that offering 
housing as a mortgage security does not serve to cancel the loan (no payment in 
kind). 
The financial sector, meanwhile, was the slowest to start its deleveraging and 
did not begin to reduce its debt in year-on-year terms until mid-2012; although from 
that point on, it did so very strongly (-24.2%), albeit with public aid. 
Non-financial companies, meanwhile, began their ongoing deleveraging proc-
ess from mid-2011. To accomplish this, they reduced their investment, as Koo fore-
saw; but also, and particularly since 2012, they have carried out lay-offs and wage 
cuts. In addition, the reduction in bank debt, from 940 to 560 billion Euros between 
2008 and June 2014, was accompanied by greater borrowing over the same period by 
non-monetary financial institutions (35 to 110 billion Euros). As Ángel Berges and 
Sara Baliña (2015, p. 22) explain, the increase of 75 billion is explained almost en-
tirely by the transfer of toxic real estate assets from the participating banks to 
SAREB (Sociedad de Gestión de Activos procedentes de la Reestructuración Ban-
caria - The Management Company for Assets Arising from the Banking Sector Re-
organisation, SAREB, known as the “bad bank”). 
Meanwhile, it is now the public sector that suffers from significant negative 
financial balances, with a significant increase in public debt - from 39.4% in 2008 to 
97.7% in 2014. These figures do not include borrowing between the different public 
bodies. If we add this, the total public debt as a proportion of GDP increases from 
46% to 135% (source: calculations using data from Eurostat and the Bank of Spain). 
As explained, the growing need for financing was largely due to the collapse in gov-
ernment revenues and, to a lesser extent, to the recapitalisation of the banks. The to-
tal public aid to the Spanish financial sector in 2008-2013 generated an increase in 
the public-debt-to-GDP ratio in 2013 of 5.3% (Henri Maurer and Patrick Grussen-
meyer 2015). In any case, the fiscal deterioration arising as a result of the recession, 
together with the perverse banking risk / sovereign risk relationship (see Section 3.3) 
activated the last latent financial fragility factor, which exacerbated the recession 
itself. Given that Spain is a member of the EMU, the banking crisis due to over-
indebtedness also became a sovereign debt crisis, particularly in 2012. The high level 
of private foreign debt, along with the rapid increase in public debt, raised at that 
point the possibility of Spain’s exit from the Euro. This led the yield on Spanish 10-
year bonds in the secondary market to exceed 7% in June 2012, while the spread vis-
à-vis German bond exceeded 600 basis points in July of that year, thereby threaten-
ing the sustainability of Spanish public debt, at least within the Eurozone (source: 
figures from the Bank of Spain). That same threat led to a large-scale withdrawal of 
foreign investors, with capital flight reaching a record figure of 296 billion Euros 
between June 2011 and 2012 (27% of GDP, according to IMF estimates), which 
deepened the credit crunch and with it the recession. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The analysis carried out on the expansion phase (1994-2008) and the subsequent on-
going recession shows that the Spanish economy has followed the pattern of specula-
tive euphoria and financial fragility suggested by Minsky, as well as the balance-
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sheet recession of Koo as an updated version of Fisher’s writings on the Great De-
pression. 
The importance of the adopted approach is that it allows the scope of our 
analysis to be widened to include the prior expansionary process in the study of the 
recession. As explained, the pattern of debt-driven growth in the private sector is vi-
tal to explaining the subsequent recession. Boom and bust are therefore closely inter-
connected, demanding that greater attention be paid to the conditions under which 
other, future growth cycles take place. 
From the study presented, it can be concluded that in the Spanish case this 
growth cycle was not normal, and neither was the ensuing recession. Rather, it has 
been an economic situation that is especially difficult to deal with, given the difficult 
combination of the recession and the slow deleveraging process described. A correct 
diagnosis of the situation, focusing on the over-indebtedness accumulated during the 
euphoric years of the boom, allows us to tackle the effects of the recession in a more 
economically and socially effective way - on the basis of its causes. Consequently, it 
is necessary to consider the formulation of alternative policies that facilitate delever-
aging and income generation. The ways in which the high indebtedness of the Span-
ish economy conditions theses alternative policies should be further investigated to 
complete the results obtained in this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 209 Lending Calling. Recession by Over-Indebtedness: Description and Specific Features of the Spanish Case 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2016, Vol. 63, Issue 2 (Special Issue), pp. 195-210
References  
 
Abdelal, Rawi. 2009. Capital Rules. The Construction of Global Finance. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Analistas Financieros Internacionales. 2012. Guía del sistema financiero Español. Madrid: 
Ediciones empresa global. 
Banyuls, Josep, and Raúl Lorente. 2008. “La industria del automóvil en España: 
reorganización de la cadena de valor y gestión laboral.” 
http://pendientedemigracion.ucm.es/info/ec/ecocri/eus/Lorente_Banyuls.pdf. 
 Berges, Ángel, and Sara Baliña. 2015. “El mapa de la deuda en España: ¿quién debe a 
quién?” Cuadernos de información económica, 244: 23-32.  
Cuerpo, Carlos, Inês Drumond, Julia Lendvai, Peter Pontuch, and Rafal Raciborski. 
2013. “Indebtedness, Deleveraging Dynamics and Macroeconomic Adjustment.” 
European Commission Economic Paper 447. 
Dimand, Robert W. 1997. “Irving Fisher and Modern Macroeconomics.” American Economy 
Review, 87(2): 442-444. 
Eichengreen, Barry, Ricardo Hausmann, and Ugo Panizza. 2002. “Original Sin: The Pain, 
the Misery and the Road to Redemption.” 
http://www.financialpolicy.org/financedev/hausmann2002.pdf. 
Fisher, Irving. 1932. Booms and Depressions: Some First Principles. New York: Adelphi 
Company Publishers. 
Fisher, Irving. 1933. “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions.” Econometrica, 
1(4): 337-357. 
Hein, Eckhard. 2013. “Finance-Dominated Capitalism, Re-Distribution and the Financial and 
Economic Crises: A European Perspective.” In Post-Keynesian Views of the Crisis and 
Its Remedies, ed. Óscar Dejuán, Eladio Febrero, and Jorge Uxó, 15-45. New York: 
Routledge. 
Kalecki, Michał. 1971. Selected Essays on the Dynamics of the Capitalist Economy 1933-
1970. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Keen, Steve. 1995. “Finance and Economic Breakdown: Modeling Minsky’s Financial 
Instability Hypothesis.” Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 17(4): 607-635. 
Keen, Steve. 2011a. Debunking Economics - Revised and Expanded Edition: The Naked 
Emperor Dethroned. London: Zed Books. 
Keen, Steve. 2011b. “A Monetary Minsky Model of the Great Moderation and the Great 
Recession.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 86(C): 221-235. 
Keynes, John Maynard. 1965. Teoría general de la ocupación, el interés y el dinero. 
México: Fondo de cultura económica, (Orig. pub. 1936). 
Kindleberger, Charles P. 2011. Historia financiera de Europa. Barcelona: Crítica, (Orig. 
pub. 1984). 
King, Mervyn. 1994. “Presidential Address: Debt Deflation: Theory and Evidence.” 
European Economic Review, 38(3-4): 419-445.  
Koo, Richard C. 2011a. “The World in Balance Sheet Recession: Causes, Cure, and 
Politics.” Real-World Economics Review, 58: 19-37. 
Koo, Richard C. 2011b. “Apuntes de la crisis global. El mundo en una recesión de balances.” 
Ensayos económicos, 63: 7-39.  
Lago Peñas, Manuel. 2012. “El gasto público: un falso culpable.” 
http://www.1mayo.org/nova/files/1018/Informe46.pdf. 
 210 Antonio Sanabria Martín and Bibiana Medialdea García 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2016, Vol. 63, Issue 2 (Special Issue), pp. 195-210 
Maurer, Henri, and Patrick Grussenmeyer. 2015. “Financial Assistance Measures in the 
Euro Area from 2008 to 2013: Statistical Framework and Fiscal Impact.” European 
Central Bank Statistics Paper 7. 
Medialdea García, Bibiana, and Antonio Sanabria Martín. 2012. “La financiarización de 
la economía mundial: hacia una caracterización.” Revista de economía mundial, 33: 
195-227. 
Minsky, Hyman P. 1982. Can “It” Happen Again? Essays on Instability and Finance. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
Minsky, Hyman P. 1986. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. London: Yale University Press.  
Moore, Basil J. 1988. “The Endogenous Money Supply.” Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, 10(3): 372-385. 
Mundell, Robert A. 1963. “Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and 
Flexible Exchange Rates.” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 
29(4): 475-485. 
Sanabria Martín, Antonio, and Bibiana Medialdea García. 2014. “La crisis de la deuda en 
España: elementos básicos y alternativas.” In Análisis y perspectivas 2014. 
Precariedad y cohesión social, ed. Fundación Foessa, 63-70. Madrid: Cáritas. 
Shiller, Robert J. 2013. “Irving Fisher, Debt Deflation, and Crisis.” Journal of the History of 
Economic Thought, 35(2): 179-183. 
Stockhammer, Engelbert. 2011. “Peripheral Europe’s Debt and German Wages: The Role of 
Wage Policy in the Euro Area.” International Journal of Public Policy, 7(1/2/3): 83-
96.  
Uxó, Jorge, Jesús Paúl, and Eladio Febrero. 2011. “Current Account Imbalances in the 
Monetary Union and the Great Recession: Causes and Policies.” Panoeconomicus, 
58(Special Issue): 571-592. 
Wolfson, Martin H. 1996. “Irving Fisher’s Debt Deflation Theory: Its Relevance to Current 
Conditions.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 20(3): 315-333.  
Wray, L. Randall. 2015. Teoría monetaria moderna: manual de macroeconomía sobre los 
sistemas monetarios soberanos. Berlin: Lola Books. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
